TUM ILLA VETUS INQUIT HEC EST. — Prosa
4
Than seide sche, "This is," quod sche, "the olde
questioun of the purveaunce of God. And Marcus Tullius, whan he
devyded the divynaciouns (that is to
seyn, in his
book that he wrot of dyvynaciouns), he moevede gretly this
questioun; and thou thiself hast ysought it mochel and outrely
and longe. But yit ne hath it nat ben determined ne isped fermely
and diligently of any of yow. And the cause of this dirknesse and
of this difficulte is, for that the moevynge of the resoun of
mankynde ne may nat moeven to (that is to
seyn,
applien or joignen to) the simplicite of the devyne
prescience; the whiche symplicite of the devyne prescience, yif
that men myghte thinken it in any manere (that is to seyn, that
yif men myghten thinken and comprehenden the thinges as God seeth
hem), thanne ne scholde ther duelle outrely no doute. The whiche
resoun and cause of difficulte I schal assaye at the laste to
schewe and to speden, whan I have first ispendid and answerd to
the resouns by whiche thou art ymoeved.
"For I axe whi thou wenest that thilke [resoun] of hem
that assoilen this questioun ne be nat speedful inow ne
sufficient; the whiche solucioun, or the whiche resoun, for that
it demeth that the prescience nis nat cause of necessite to
thinges to comen, than ne weneth it nat that fredom of wil be
distorbed or ylet he prescience. For ne drawestow nat argumentz
fro elleswhere of the necessite of thingis to comen
(as who seith, any oothir wey than
thus) but that
thilke thinges that the prescience woot byforn ne mowen nat
unbetyde (that is to seyn, that thei
moten
betide)? But thanne, yif that prescience ne putteth no
necessite to thingis to comen, as thou thiself bast confessed it
and byknowen a litel herebyforn, what cause or what is it
(as who seith, ther may no cause
be) by whiche that
the endes voluntarie of thinges myghten be constreyned to certein
bytydynge? For by grace of posicioun, so that thou mowe the
betere undirstonde this that folweth, I pose that ther ne be no
prescience. Thanne axe I," quod sche, "in as moche as
aperteneth to that, scholden thanne thingis that comen of fre wil
ben constreyned to bytiden by necessite?"
Boecius. "Nay," quod
I.
"Thanne ayeinward," quod sche, "I suppose that
ther be prescience, but that it ne putteth no necessite to
thingis; thanne trowe I that thilke selve fredom of wil schal
duellen al hool and absolut and unbounden. But thou wolt seyn
that, al be it so that prescience nis nat cause of the necessite
of bytydynge to thingis to comen, algatis yit it is a signe that
the thingis ben to bytyden by necessite. By this manere thanne,
althoughe the prescience ne hadde nevere iben, yit algate, or at
the leste wey, it is certein thing that the endes and bytydinges
of thingis to comen scholden ben necessarie. For every signe
scheweth and signifieth oonly what the thing is, but it ne makith
nat the thing that it signifieth. For whiche it byhoveth first
to schewen that nothing ne bytideth that it ne betideth by
necessite, so that it mai apiere that the prescience is signe of
this necessite; or elles, yif ther nere no necessite, certes
thilke prescience ne myghte nat ben signe of thing that nis nat.
But certes, it is now certein that the proeve of this, isusteyned
by stedfast resoun, ne schal nat ben lad ne proeved by signes,
ne by argumentz itaken fro withoute, but by causes covenable and
necessarie.
"But thou mayst seyn, 'How may it be that the
thingis ne betyden nat that ben ipurveied to comen? But certes,
ryght as we [troweden] that tho thingis whiche that the
purveaunce woot byforn to comen, ne ben nat to bytiden!'
But that ne scholde we nat demen; but rathir, althoughe that thei
schal betyden, yit ne have thei no necessite of hir kynde to
betyden. And this maystow lyghtly aperceyven by this that I schal
seyn. For we seen many thingis whan
thei ben done
byforn oure eyen, ryght as men seen the cartere worken in the
tornynge and in atemprynge or adressynge of hise cartes or
chariottes, and by this manere (as who seith, maistow
undirstonden) of alle othere werkmen. Is ther thanne any
necessite (as who seith, in our lookynge) that constreynith or
compelleth any of thilke thingis to ben don so?"
Boece. "Nay,"
quod I, "for in
idel and in veyn were al the effect of craft, yif that alle
thingis weren moeved by constreynynge (that is to seyn, by
constreinynge of our eyen or of our sighte)."
Philosophie. "The
thingis thanne,"
quod she, "that, whan men doon hem, ne han no necessite that
men doon hem, eek tho same thingis, first or thei ben don, thei
ben to comen withoute necessite. Forwhy ther ben some thingis to
betyden, of whiche the eendes and the bytydynges of hem ben
absolut and quit of alle necessite. For certes I ne trowe nat
that any man wolde seyn this: that tho thingis that men don now,
that thei ne weren to bytiden first or thei weren idoon; and
thilke same thinges, althoughe that men hadden iwyst hem byforn,
yit thei han fre bytydynges. For ryght as science of thingis
present ne bryngith in no necessite to thingis that men doon,
right so the prescience of thinges to comen ne bryngith in no
necessite to thinges to bytiden.
"But thou maist seyn that of thilke same it is idouted,
as whethir that of thilke thingis that ne han noon issues and
bytidynges necessaries, yif therof mai ben any prescience. For
certes thei semen to discorden, for thou wenest that yif that
thingis ben iseyn byfore, that necessite folwith hem; and yif
necessite faileth hem, thei ne myghten nat ben wist byforn; and
that nothing may be comprehended by science but certein. And yif
tho thinges that ne han no certein bytydingis ben ipurveied as
certein, it scholde ben dirknesse of opinioun, nat sothfastnesse
of science. And thou wenest that it be dyvers fro the holnesse
of science that any man scholde deme a thing to ben otherwyse
than it is itself.
"And the cause of this errour is that of alle the
thingis
that every wyght hath iknowe, thei wenen that tho thingis ben
iknowe al only by the strengthe and by the nature of the thinges
that
ben iwyst or iknowe. And it is al the contrarye; for al that
evere is iknowe, it is rather comprehendid and knowen, nat aftir
his strengthe and his nature, but aftir the faculte (that is to
seyn, the power and the nature) of hem that knowen. And, for that
this schal mowen schewen by a schort ensaumple, the same
rowndnesse of a body, otherweys the sighte of the eighe knoweth
it, and otherweys the touchynge. The lookynge, by castynge of his
bemys, waiteth and seeth fro afer al the body togidre, withoute
moevynge of itself; but the touchynge clyveth and conjoyneth to
the rounde body, and moeveth aboute the envyrounynge, and
comprehendeth by parties the roundnesse. And the man hymself,
ootherweys wit byholdeth hym, and ootherweys ymaginacioun, and
otherweyes resoun, and ootherweies intelligence. For the wit
comprehendith withoute-forth the figure of the body of the man
that is establisschid in the matere subgett; but the ymaginacioun
comprehendith oonly the figure withoute the matere; resoun
surmountith ymaginacioun and comprehendith by an universel
lokynge the comune spece that is in the singuler peces. But the
eighe of intelligence is heyere, for it surmountith the
envyrounynge of the universite, and loketh over that bi pure
subtilte of thought thilke same symple forme of man that is
perdurablely in the devyne thought. In whiche this oughte gretly
to ben considered, that the heyeste strengthe to comprehenden
thinges enbraseth and contienith the lowere strengthe; but the
lower strengthe ne ariseth nat in no manere to the heyere
strengthe. For wit ne mai no thing comprehende out of matere ne
the ymaginacioun ne loketh nat the universel speces, ne resoun
ne taketh nat the symple forme so as intelligence takith it; but
intelligence, that lookith [as] aboven, whanne it hath
comprehended the forme, it knowith and demyth alle the thinges
that ben undir that foorme; but sche knoweth hem in thilke manere
in the whiche it comprehendith thilke same symple forme that ne
may
nevere ben knowen to noon of that othere (that
is to seyn, to none of tho thre forseyde strengthis of the
soule). For it knoweth the universite of resoun, and the figure
of ymaginacioun, and the sensible material conceyved by wit; ne
it ne useth nat nor of resoun ne of ymaginacioun ne of wit
withoute-forth; but it byholdeth alle thingis, so as I schal
seie, by [o] strook of thought formely (withoute
discours or collacioun). Certes resoun, whan it lokith any
thing universel, it ne useth nat of ymaginacioun, nor of wit; and
algatis yit it comprehendith the thingis ymaginable and sensible.
For reson is she that diffynyscheth the universel of here
conceyte ryght thus: man is a resonable two-foted beest. And how
so that this knowynge is universel, yit nis ther no wyght that
ne wot wel that a man is a thing ymaginable and sensible; and
this same considereth wel resoun; but that nis nat by
ymaginacioun nor by wit, but it lookith it by resonable
concepcioun. Also ymaginacioun, albeit so that it takith of wit
the bygynnynges to seen and to formen the figures, algates
althoughe that wit ne were nat present, yit it envyrowneth and
comprehendith alle thingis sensible, nat by resoun sensible of
demynge, but by resoun ymaginatyf. Seestow nat thanne that alle
the thingis in knowynge usen more of hir faculte or of hir power
than thei don of the faculte or power of thingis that ben iknowe?
Ne that nis nat wrong; for so as every jugement is the dede or
the doyng of hym that demeth, it byhoveth that every wyght
performe the werk and his entencioun, nat of foreyne power, but
of his propre power.
